Publication: Assistant Professor Xavier Landes on Market Governance
SSE Riga Assistant Professor Xavier Landes edited with Lille Catholic University professor Malik Bozzo-Rey a symposium on market governance in the Journal of Social Philosophy.
The symposium deals with the issue of market regulation. It offers contributions of Joseph Heath (University of Toronto), Wayne Norman and Aaron Ancell (Duke University), Xavier Landes (SSE Riga) and Pierre-Yves Néron (Lille Catholic University) as well as Nahshon Perez (Bar-Ilan University). More: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.
"The idea behind this special issue is to bridge the gap between economists and moral/political philosophers. Too often, regulation is seen by the former as a pure matter of efficiency while the latter tend to analyze it as a question of moral and political principles. In this symposium (special issue), we are offering to the readers analysis that combine the two. Namely, we are showing that regulation encapsulates inescapable normative (i.e. moral) dimensions. When public institutions intervene for altering market functioning, they do so by mobilizing efficiency and other kinds of arguments (e.g. linked to equality, distribution, fairness, democracy). We also wanted to show to normative thinkers that the language and concepts used by economists (e.g. market failures) need to be taken seriously, that they are fruitful for thinking what legitimate interference could look like."
The issue contains an article from Xavier Landes (SSE Riga) co-written with Pierre-Yves Néron (Lille Catholic University) titled "Morality and Market Failures: Asymmetry of Information".
The authors build on the market failure approach to normative economics initiated by William Baumol and the New Welfare Economics. Following the footsteps of the works of normative thinkers such as Joseph Heath or Wayne Norman, they claim that the concept of market failures has a further reach than only efficiency. It has a genuine moral content. In the article, Landes and Néron explore such content and show how traditional economic concepts could provide useful tools to moral and political theorists for conceiving regulation as well as to policy makers for elaborating regulatory tools.